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 NASA Mission and Organization - 5
 Major Mission Failures and Causes - 10
 Cultural Changes Resulting from Failures -10
 Safety at NASA Today - 5
 Best Safety Practices - 15
 Safety Challenges - 5
 Future Commitment - 5
 1958 NASA Space Act created the Agency with 
aeronautical and space objectives including: 
(1) The expansion of human knowledge of the Earth 
and of phenomena in the atmosphere and space;
(2) The improvement of the usefulness, 
performance,…. of aeronautical and space vehicles;
(3) The development and operation of vehicles capable 
of carrying instruments,… and living organisms 
through space;……..
 The Act does not define organization: safety appears 
three times in document – dealing with liability and 
public safety


 Skylab
 1st US space station
 3 crew members
 3 missions, 29, 59, 
and 84 days 
 Experimental and 
observational 
platform
 Apollo-Soyuz
 1st international 
manned spaceflight
 Test rendezvous and 
docking system 
compatibility
 Opening for future 
manned spaceflights
 1975

 Apollo 1
 Capsule fire
 Loss of 3 lives
 Major redesign of capsule systems
 Challenger in 1986
 Loss of seven crewmembers and national asset
 Presidential commission chartered to determine root cause and 
recommend corrective actions to prevent recurrence
 Columbia in 2003
 Loss of seven crewmembers and national asset
 Agency administrator appointed investigation team to 
determine root cause and recommend actions to prevent 
recurrences
 Challenger root cause was burn through of o-ring at 
field joint exacerbated by cold ambient temperature
 Lack of engineering understanding of field joint 
performance over entire environmental operating 
range
 Stiffled communications paths between engineers and 
decision-makers
 Lack of closed loop problem reporting system 
elevating anomalous behavior to management
 Lack of an active safety program

 Decision making process seriously flawed leading up 
to launch of Challenger
 Waiving of launch constraints appeared to be at 
expense of flight safety and was not reviewed by all 
levels of management
 Marshall management appears to hold potentially 
serious problems internally
 Tracking of anomalies for Flight Readiness Reviews 
failed in not identifying joint seal failures on previous 
flights 
 O-ring failure history presented to NASA Level I 
August 1985 was sufficient to require corrective action 
before next flight
 A careful flight history analysis would have revealed 
the correlation of O-ring damage with low 
temperatures
 Reductions in Marshall safety, reliability, and quality 
assurance work force limited capability in those 
functions
 Organization structures at Kennedy and Marshall place 
safety, reliability, and quality assurance offices under the 
offices whose activities they are to check
 Problem reporting requirements are not concise and fail 
to communicate to proper management 

“The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its crew 
was a breach in the Thermal Protection System on the 
leading edge of the left wing.”
“..the management practices overseeing the Space Shuttle 
Program were as much a cause of the accident as the 
foam that struck the left wing.”
 Loss of structural integrity of vehicle caused by hot gas 
ingestion due to external foam impact damage of 
Orbiter reinforced carbon-carbon leading edge
 Lack of fundamental understanding of hardware 
behavior over expected and observed environment
 Safety program was not strong
 Stifled communications between engineers and 
decision-makers
 Closed loop problem reporting system was not 
effective in identifying open safety issues 
 Provide continual and independent program oversight 
and program review functions that emphasize safety
 Ensure quality program and safety management that 
have clear definition of authority and responsibility 
and have resources commensurate with requirements
 Maintain comprehensive and effective program 
processes and systems that support the safety risk 
management function.
 Maintain realistic plans that have provisions for 
flexibility, minimize outside pressures, and stress flight 
and ground safety
 Control effectively the development of critical items 
with respect to performance environments, tolerances, 
margins, manufacturing processes, testing, and safety
 Ensure quality performance of work force involved in 
safety critical operations including adherence to 
required procedures and constraints
 Provide cultural climate conducive to expression of 
differing opinions and open dialog
 Institution of Headquarters level Office of Safety and 
Mission Assurance with vote at flight readiness 
assessments
 Strengthened problem reporting processes
 Safety organizations grew to provide deeper support to 
projects and independent assessment of issues
 Safety reporting avenues increased
 National Safety Reporting System
 NASA Safety Hotline

 Technical authority responsibilities strengthened 
 Voting role for Engineering and Safety in decision process
 Information flow to decision makers
 Dissenting opinion process formalized
 Numerous options to report employee concerns
 Leadership expectations are communicated/reinforced 
through actions
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 Expectation is that personnel speak up and address 
safety issues
 Management expectation of supporting individuals 
who voice dissenting opinion in project decision 
forums, technical dissenting opinions are actively 
solicited
 Effort to draw out individuals who are not normally 
outgoing in public forums
 Intimidation, exclusion, squelching, ignoring of safety 
input is not tolerated
 Risks are assessed using a hazard frequency-
consequence template – provides common language 
for risk discussion
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 Safety Boards address safety concerns/issues with 
project items
 Flight equipment safety review panel
 Space Station/Space Shuttle Safety Review Panel
 Boards are chaired by safety office with membership 
consisting of engineering, project, safety professionals  
 Boards are integral to flight review process
 JSC is an OSHA VPP Star Site
 Monitoring and continually improving performance
 Effective safety enhancement practices 
 Weekly management safety walk-arounds weekly
 Close call reports to heighten awareness of issues
 Safety Briefings begin each organizational staff meeting
 Review issues from past week
 Safety topics discussed to share lessons learned across organization
 Safety topics discussed with employees in staff meetings
 JSC holds annual safety and total health day dedicated 
to addressing safety in the workplace and mission 
safety 
 Work stand down to address job safety training, address open 
safety issues,  and participate in safety presentations on 
organizational/home safety concerns
 Safety is part of individual job performance and is part 
of evaluation
Leadership Prevention
Reaction Issue Resolution
Continue to encourage safe 
behaviors, attitudes, and employee 
involvement. 
MEASURES:
• S&H Topic Participation 
• S&H Forum Participation
• JSC Safety Action Team  
Sponsorship
Improve employee participation in 
prevention activities.
MEASURES:
• S&H Training Delivery
• Close Call Submission & 
Acceptance
• Building Inspection
Reduce mishaps and improve 
investigation response.
MEASURES:
• Mishap Rate vs. Industry vs. 
NASA Target
• Event Rate Performance 
• Mishap Timeliness Metric 
Assure response to challenges 
reflect thoughtful approach to 
risk mitigation.
MEASURES:
• Minimized Issue Impact
• Feedback on Issue Response
• Effectiveness of Corrective 
Actions 
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(Onsite Cases)
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(All Cases)
OSHA Recordable Rate
Non OSHA Recordable Rate Damage Rate
"Team" = JSC / ELL / SCTF / WSTF - Civil Servant and Contractor community 
OSHA Recordables = Death, Days Away, Restricted, Medical Treatment, and OSHA Illness
Non OSHA Recordable = First Aids, Non-OSHA Illness, and No Treatments (Reportable cases per JPR 1700.1)
Damages = Equipment or Property regardless of $ value
Rates =
(Cases * 200,000) /  Hours


